Turkey’s War on the Kurds and ISIS - Part One

By Thomas Phillips - 28/07/2015

Introduction

On 24th July, the newspapers reported that Turkish fighter jets had, for the first time, struck ISIS targets in Syria and rounded up hundreds of suspected militants within its own borders. The justification for this sudden volte-face, provided by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is that “the Deash [ISIS] problem is a primary national security threat for Turkey”[i]. Communications were lodged with the United Nations claiming Turkey’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter[ii].

Later on that day, Turkish F16s and artillery began to pound PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. Some of the bombs were dropped on areas inhabited by Kurdish civilians. According to Rudaw, two injured civilians were carried to hospital in the aftermath of the Turkish bombardment of Amediye region in Dohuk province – one of the victims was twelve years old and the other lost his leg. According to Rudaw’s correspondent “around 400 villagers have been isolated in a remote area in that region due to the shelling” [iii].

Turkey’s caretaker government has for some time been spinning a narrative that places the theocratic fascism of ISIS in the same category as the Kurdish PKK. On Friday, President Erdogan stated that all terrorist organisations must lay down their weapons or face consequences[iv]. In return, the PKK says “the truce has no meaning anymore after these intense airstrikes by the occupant Turkish army”[v].

Turkey’s latest move creates significant tension in Obama’s declared plan to “degrade and destroy ISIL” in partnership with local forces. The PKK and the PYD have been on the frontlines of that fight, rescuing Yazidis from their parlous situation on Mount Sinjar, intervening when Erbil was on the verge of invasion, driving ISIS out of swathes of northern Syria, manning the frontlines in Kirkuk (along with the peshmerga) and making its presence felt across the border in Iraq. At the same time, the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, have been making genuine attempts to resolve the perennial Kurdish Question in Turkey by calling for a “reinforced ceasefire”, dropping its demand for an independent Kurdish state, and proposing democratic moves by the AKP government.

So how have we ended up in this situation? It is the aim of this article to explore the events leading up to the return to war. An obvious starting point is to consider the justification advanced by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

‘Deash is a primary national security threat for Turkey’

The language of this statement has been very carefully crafted. ISIS is not the primary national security threat – it is one among several. Nevertheless, by a careful examination of recent history it is possible to infer ISIS’ position in Turkey’s ranking of national security threats.

In September 2014, ISIS launched a huge attack on the town of Kobanî – a majority Kurdish town abutting the Turkish border. Several days into the attack, the UNHCR’s representative informed Reuters that “at least 70,000 people are confirmed to have crossed into Turkey in less than two days, and the real figure may be more than 100,000”[vi]. The Syrian Kurdish forces were left to their own devices for several weeks until the United States decided to launch airstrikes against the advancing forces. Matters became so parlous in Kobanî that most sympathetic commentators began to predict its demise as neighborhood after neighborhood fell to ISIS.

Faced with the possibility of sharing more of its border with ISIS – supposedly a primary national security threat – Turkey did nothing to help the Kurdish forces in their resistance and manipulated border security to make their fight more difficult. Only when the government was pressured by the US did it eventually agree to allow a small contingent of Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga to enter Kobanî to aid in its defence. By the time the fighting ended, half of Kobanî lay in ruins[vii].

In his book The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising, the veteran journalist Patrick Cockburn noted that there was a crucial link between Turkey and ISIS: “The combat forces of the Syrian army have hitherto been able to fight on only one front at a time, while it has become increasingly obvious that al-Qaeda type movements, notably ISIS, JAN and Ahrar al-Sham, can operate freely across Syria’s borders with Iraq and Turkey. They have a vast hinterland in which to maneuver”[viii]. Similarly, Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss write about their encounter with an ISIS amni (security official) called Abu Adnan: “Abu Adnan claimed to have [a] network of smugglers on the Syrian-Turkish border who would help potential fighters enter Syria to join ISIS. They operated in plain sight of the Turkish authorities and, like Abu Adnan, wouldn’t be conspicuously out of place in any Western city”[ix].

In May 2015, US Special Forces raided the compound of an ISIS leader in eastern Syria. The target was an ISIS official named Abu Sayyaf, who was responsible for the organisation’s lucrative oil smuggling business. According to a senior western official familiar with the intelligence gathered at the compound, “direct dealings between Turkish officials and ranking ISIS members was now ‘undeniable’”[x]. The unnamed official went on to say, “There are hundreds of flash drives and documents that were seized there… They are being analysed at the moment, but the links are already so clear that they could end up having profound policy implications for the relationship between us and Ankara”[xi].

The Turkish authorities have gone to great lengths to keep their links with jihadist forces under wraps. In May 2015, Turkish news outlets reported that four public prosecutors who had been involved in the search of MIT trucks allegedly carrying weapons to rebel groups in northern Syria had been arrested for “attempting to topple or incapacitate the Turkish government through the use of force or coercion and exposing information regarding the security and political activities of the state”[xii]. The prosecutors, who are now facing the prospect of life sentences, said in their testimony that “some state officials did not differentiate between a state duty, collecting intelligence and being involved in terrorism, and that they had unlawful relations with ISIL and similar organisations operating in Syria”[xiii]. Secret official documents about the searching of the MIT trucks, leaked online and authenticated by Al-Monitor, showed that “the trucks were found to be transporting missiles, mortars and anti-aircraft ammunition”. The Gendarmerie General Command, which apparently authored the reports alleged, “the trucks were carrying weapons and supplies to the al-Qaeda terror organisation”[xiv]. Turkish citizens were unable to see those secret documents in their news bulletins because the government immediately obtained a court injunction banning all reporting about the affair.

There are many other articles and research papers purporting to demonstrate Turkish support for ISIS (see, for example, David Phillips’ research paper). The main point for present purposes is to demonstrate that the Turkish government has thus far viewed ISIS as a lesser evil than both the Assad government and the oppressed Kurds, and having allowed ISIS to grow and prosper, it now turns around and complains that its national security is under threat. Of course, this will necessitate greater Turkish influence over the primary enemy, namely the autonomous Kurdish cantons in northern Syria.

None of this comes as any great surprise – as far back as February 2015 the US intelligence chief, James Clapper, said that Turkey viewed the Kurds as a greater threat than ISIS, “and, of course, the consequence of that is a permissive environment… because of their laws and the ability of people to travel through Turkey en route to Syria… So somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 percent of those foreign fighters find their way to Syria through Turkey”[xv].

None of this is to suggest that Turkey will not take genuine steps to undermine ISIS. The government does not seem to value ISIS for its intrinsic qualities; rather, it has until now been seen as a useful tool to advance Turkish aims in the region.

References:

[i] Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release Concerning Turkey-US Understanding on Countering Deash, mfa.gov.tr/no_-212_-24-july-2015_-press-statement-concerning-turkey_us-understanding-on-countering-deash.en.mfa

[ii] BGN News, Turkey Justifies Syria Air Strikes in Letter to United Nations, national.bgnnews.com/turkey-justifies-syria-air-strikes-in-letter-to-united-nations-haberi/7963

[iii] Rudaw, Turkish Shelling Injures Kurdish Civilians, rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/250720153

[iv] New York Times, Turkey Attacks Kurdish Militant Camps in Northern Iraq, nytimes.com/2015/07/26/world/middleeast/turkey-attacks-kurdish-militant-camps-in-northern-iraq.html

[v] Reuters, Turkey Strikes Islamic State, Kurdish Militants in Drive for ‘Safe Zone’, uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/25/uk-mideast-crisis-turkey-idUKKCN0PZ03L20150725

[vi] Reuters, Syrian Refugee Flight to Turkey one of the Worst Since War Began, uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/21/uk-iraq-crisis-turkey-refugees-idUKKBN0HG0DK20140921

[vii] Vice News, ‘Welcome to Stalingrad. Welcome to Kobane’: Inside the Syrian Town Under Siege by Islamic State, news.vice.com/article/welcome-to-stalingrad-welcome-to-kobane-inside-the-syrian-town-under-siege-by-the-islamic-state

[viii] P. Cockburn, The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising (2014, OR Books) at p. 137.

[ix] M. Weiss and H. Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (2015, Regan Arts) at p. 212.

[x] Martin Chulov, Turkey Sends in Jets as Syria’s Agony Spills Over Every Border, theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/26/isis-syria-turkey-us?CMP=share_btn_tw

[xi] Ibid

[xii] Todays Zaman, Testimonies of arrested prosecutors show state had links with ISIL, todayszaman.com/national_testimonies-of-arrested-prosecutors-show-state-had-links-with-isil_380333.html

[xiii] Ibid

[xiv] al-Monitor, Turkish Military says MIT Shipped Weapons to al-Qaeda, al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/turkey-syria-intelligence-service-shipping-weapons.html

[xv] Rudaw, US spy chief: Turkey more concerned with Kurds than fighting ISIS, rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/27022015

Read Part Two of this article here

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